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Historical and political context 
 While the death of Deng Xiaoping in1997 marked the end of strongman 
politics it did not represent a paradigm shift in the politics of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC). Deng’s death merely signalled an end to an era during which the 
paramount leader could exert power disproportionate to the office or position he held 
in the state or party apparatus and exert a decisive or nearly decisive influence on 
politics in general and government policies in particular. The political setup in China 
after Deng was laid down well in advance. Indeed, Deng even pre-arranged the 
succession of his own immediate successor as leader of the country. Although he 
was Deng’s successor as the ‘third generation’ leader Jiang Zemin had neither the 
scope nor the personal clout to assert himself as a new strongman. Deng had not 
intended to give him the scope to do so, as reflected in the naming of Hu Jintao as 
Jiang’s successor. Nor were Jiang’s colleagues willing to see him emerge as a new 
strongman.   
 Jiang’s coming out of the shadow of Deng after the latter’s death in 1997 as 
the real leader of China in a sense marked a return of the Communist Party system 
to what it was supposed to be just after it seized power in 1949. The system that was 
put in place was meant to be a collective leadership of the top party leaders with a 
core leader being the first among equals. In the history of the PRC, such an 
arrangement was formally maintained in the early 1950s even though Mao was in 
reality a dominant figure from the time when the PRC was founded. The principle of 
collective leadership ended when Mao Zedong forced his comrades to choose 
between accepting his leadership above the collective wisdom of the Party or allow 
him to wage war against the party leadership at the Lushan Conference of 1959 (Li, 
1993: 226-36). Mao’s comrades backed down and allowed the Great Leap Forward 
to be reinvigorated at a time when there could be little illusion that this would bring 
catastrophic consequences to the country (Chan, 2001: 107-8). This marked the rise 
of a particularly vicious brand of strongman politics within the Communist system, 
which allowed Mao to launch the disastrous Cultural Revolution less than a decade 
later.  
It is true that the post-Mao Communist Party leadership was determined to 
make the Maoist period an aberration and other veteran party leaders like Chen Yun 
tried to check Deng’s power and ensure a collective leadership would replace the 
Maoist dictatorship (Yang, 2004:15-8). Ironically even Deng himself rejected the 
Maoist approach in building a personality cult or the Maoist brand of strongman 
politics when he started the reform process.  
Indeed, in the early years of the Dengist period he pushed for a programme to 
strengthen the political institutions of the PRC. However, he gradually asserted 
himself as the paramount leader (Zhong, 2007a: 153-4). Deng used his relative 
dominance in Chinese politics to push forward his economic reform programme in 
the 1980s, to play a pivotal role in directing the military crackdown and restore order 
and the dominance of the Communist Party in June 1989, and to re-launch his policy 
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of reform in 1992. Thus, until his death Deng maintained a different and a less 
vicious brand of strongman politics than that prevailed under Mao. He took on the 
mantle of a strongman because the political system and his personal history within 
the Communist Party allowed him to do so, and he thought he was doing so for a 
good cause (Zhong, 2007b: 153-4). 
 With Deng’s passing the top Communist leaders had an understanding among 
themselves that they needed to change the way how the country was to be governed. 
With the original revolutionary leaders almost all passed from the scene, a return to 
strongman politics was generally seen as undesirable. Moreover, there was no one 
who could stand out sufficiently to assert a degree of personal impact on politics that 
Deng could and retain loyalty among other leaders. The critical questions for the 
post-Deng leadership were the direction and nature of changes to be introduced. The 
basic premises were that whatever they would be they must ensure, first and 
foremost, the continuation of Communist Party rule and, in order to achieve this, 
stability, order, steadily improving living conditions and improved governance.  
 Jiang’s rise to the top of political power coincided with an upsurge of the 
attraction of democracy as an idea in the global context, as it was the decade that 
saw the collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Although 
Francis Fukuyama was wrong in proclaiming the ‘end of history’ as the Soviet camp 
lost the Cold War, his bold statement captured the spirit of the time (Fukuyama, 
1992). In the 1990s it was not unreasonable to ask whether China might also move 
towards democratization when strongman politics came to an end. But the Chinese 
leaders saw this prospect as a threat to themselves and all that they represented 
rather than as a solution to the predicaments they faced. They looked at the idea that 
China should change in the direction advocated by the West under the ‘hegemonic’ 
leadership of the United States of America (USA) in terms of a ‘peaceful evolution’ 
conspiracy (Nelan, 1991). It was one that the Chinese Communist Party leadership 
was determined to resist. 
 Nevertheless, China under Jiang, and his successor Hu Jintao, did seek to 
find an alternative to strongman politics in governing China. Jiang was the first ever 
top leader of the PRC who referred to the Communist Party as a governing party 
(Tan & Xiao, 2006: 48) thus implying recognition of the need for the Party to justify its 
continuous rule. However, this does not mean he took the position that the Party’s 
status as a vanguard party had ended. Instead of looking at democratization as an 
alternative way forward he and his successor, Hu, prefer to go back into China’s own 
past, both in the Communist period and before, to find a solution. This chapter 
examines the Communist Party leadership’s search for a non-democratic 
development model since 1997 and its implications. 
 
Good governance as an alternative to democracy  
 What the post-Deng leadership in China seek is a development model in the 
twenty-first century that is different from Western liberal democracy (Pan, 2008). It 
reflects on the one hand a sense of national pride that China should have its own 
model of development. On the other hand, and much more importantly, this approach 
is predicated by the nature and the history of the Leninist regime in China. The idea 
of ‘learning to lose’ as the dominant political party in an authoritarian state 
transforming into a liberal democracy must do is anathema to the Communist Party. 
   The sense of national pride is deeply rooted in the general history of China, 
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which has been greatly reinforced since 1989 by the Communist Party adopting 
nationalism as the new ideological force to unite the country and buttress its own rule 
after Communism all but collapsed as the state ideology. China was until around the 
sixteenth century the world leader in scientific development, communication, 
production technologies and administrative organisation. It also accounted for a large 
percentage of world output prior to the twentieth century. It was estimated to have 
produced 26.2 per cent of world GDP two thousand years ago, 22.7 per cent in 1000, 
25 per cent in 1500, and 32.9 per cent in 1820, shortly before it was humbled by 
Queen Victoria’s rising British Empire (Maddison, 2001: 263). While Hu Jintao may 
not know this history well, he feels that ‘[i]n a history that spans more than five 
millennia, the Chinese nation has contributed significantly to the progress of human 
civilization’ and it must therefore adopt ‘a new concept of development in line with its 
national conditions and the requirement of the times’ (Hu, 2006). Looking back into 
history, Chinese leaders and intellectuals are justified in thinking that since China’s 
own approach had sustained itself as a ‘superpower’ in the pre-modern age, there is 
no logical reason why a new resurgent China cannot or should not do so again in the 
twenty-first century.  
 This intellectual justification based on history, be it convincing or not, is greatly 
reinforced by the Party’s tight control over historical narrative in China’s school text 
books and the promotion of nationalism since 1989. Few citizens of the PRC in fact 
know the history of their country well but they have all been indoctrinated in the 
greatness of China’s long civilization and the iniquity of the ‘century of humiliation’ 
when China suffered from Western imperialism after 1838 (Yuan, 2006). The 
nationalism promoted since 1989 is essentially xenophobic in nature, which 
encouraged the Chinese people to identify with a rising China under the leadership 
of the Communist Party in juxtaposition against the West that is portrayed as 
uncomfortable with China’s resurgence.1 The idea that China should find its own 
development model rather than import a variant of the dominant democratic model 
from the West is, therefore, one that has wide appeal in China.2 
 Even more powerful a factor is the fact that although Communism is no longer 
routinely upheld as the state ideology and Communism is no longer the ultimate goal 
for development, the Communist Party remains essentially Leninist in character. This 
means it is fundamentally anti-democratic in the meaning of the term in the Western 
liberal tradition.  
 The leading role and position of the Party is enshrined in the Constitution of 
the PRC, and remains the basic principle that underpins the political system in China 
(People’s Republic of China, 1982). The replacement of strongman politics by a 
liberal democratic one will require the Communist Party to give up its constitutionally 
enshrined leading position and contest for a popular mandate to govern periodically 
through open and fair elections. This goes against the basic belief of the Communist 
Party about democracy, which is that the Party fully supports ‘democracy’ as long as 
electoral outcomes are predictable and guaranteed to be correct as seen by the 
Party leadership. The mechanism that guarantees this is the principle of democratic 
centralism and its Maoist variant known as ‘from the masses and to the masses’. In 
essence this means the Party must go to the masses to collect and collate ideas from 
them, then organize and otherwise add new input to produce a coherent and 
constructive set of policies and then take them back to the masses, educate and 
otherwise induce the masses to embrace such polices as their own ideas (Saich, 
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2004: 44). When the Communist Party refers to ‘democracy’ in China this is in 
general terms the meaning it has in mind. 
 The search for an alternative to democratization in the post-strongman era is 
based on a need for the Communist Party, still the ‘vanguard party’ or ‘guardian’ of 
the people, to devise and implement a model that will deliver stability, order, 
prosperity and good governance. The first post-Deng manifestation of this new model 
was described by Jiang Zemin in terms of ‘the Three Represents’, a concept he 
articulated for the first time in July 2001. This required the Party to represent ‘the 
development trend of China's advanced productive forces, the orientation of China's 
advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the 
Chinese people’ (www.people.com.cn, 2006). Jiang elaborated on this by saying:  
The whole Party must always maintain the spirit of advancing with the times 
and constantly extend Marxist theory into new realms; it must give top priority 
to development in governing and invigorating the country and constantly break 
new ground and open up a new prospect in the modernization drive; it must 
fully mobilize all positive factors and constantly generate new strength for the 
great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation; and it must improve its Party building 
in a spirit of reform and constantly inject new vitality into itself 
(www.people.com.cn, 2006). 
Jiang’s concept was not clearly spelled out except on upholding the leading role of 
the Party with a new requirement. It was the need to broaden the basis of the Party 
from an alliance of workers and peasants to include the culturally advance and 
economically vibrant elements of society though still firmly under the leadership of 
senior party apparatchiks.  
After Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang as General Secretary of the Communist 
Party in 2002 and as state President in 2003, he gradually modified Jiang’s approach. 
He downplays the concept of ‘the Three Represents’ and adopts a policy of 
promoting a socialist harmonious society. Hu’s formula stipulates that ‘a harmonious 
society should feature democracy, the rule of law, equity, justice, sincerity, amity and 
vitality’ in order to produce ‘lasting stability and unity’ (Hu, 2005). More specifically, 
Hu calls for: 
 sustained, rapid and coordinated economic growth both in the countryside and 
in the urban regions; 
 allowing public opinions to be articulated so that ‘a democratic policy-making 
mechanism will help balance different social interests and avoid social 
conflicts’; 
 rigorous implementation of ‘the rule of law’ in all political, administrative and 
judicial sectors to check the abuse of power; 
 balancing different interests and strive ‘to ensure equality for all in terms of 
personal rights, opportunities, game-playing rules and wealth distribution’;  
 establishing a social management system to handle the people's internal 
contradictions to prevent them from posing risks to the overall development of 
the country; and 
 strengthening environmental protection in order to pre-empt serious social 
problems (Hu, 2005). 
 
Whether it is Jiang’s ‘three represents’ or Hu’s ‘socialist harmonious society’ 
policy, the real thrusts of reform in the political arena are to improve governance, 
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reach out to the general public, redress public grievances and improve living 
conditions. The key instrument for delivering improvements in these areas remains 
the government controlled by the Communist Party itself. The development model 
that the post-Deng leadership has adopted is intended to pre-empt popular demands 
for liberal democracy and to be based on a strengthened benevolent one party 
system that practises democratic centralism.  
 
Consultative Leninism  
 The traditional Chinese concept of ‘the ideal government… is one which is 
efficient, fair, honest and paternalistic, yet non-intrusive vis-à-vis the life of the 
ordinary people’ (Tsang, 1995: 5). This is not a template that the Chinese Communist 
leadership intends to adopt after the end of strongman politics. Not least it is because 
the traditional Chinese concept goes fundamentally against the nature of the 
Communist Party in a key area. Being a Leninist institution the Communist Party is 
about pro-actively leading and directing developments in the country and mobilizing 
the general population to follow its lead. Such an approach inherently requires the 
Party to intrude into the life of the ordinary people. The other qualities cherished in 
traditional China are not objectionable to the Communist Party, as long as it is the 
judge of efficiency, fairness and honesty. As a vanguard party, paternalism – again, 
as interpreted and judged by itself, is in any event integral to what it represents.  
 The definition of ‘good governance with Chinese characteristics’ is one that 
needs to be treated carefully. The ‘Chineseness’ in this concept is not based on the 
traditional Chinese culture. Instead, it is what the Communist Party, as the ruler and 
‘guardian’ of China, decides as appropriate for China.  
It should, however, be pointed out that this also does not exclude the adoption 
of traditional Chinese concepts, and the idea of a ‘socialist harmonious society’ 
represents an appropriation of a well known Confucian concept by the Party.3 Indeed, 
in defining good governance with Chinese characteristics the Communist Party looks 
back into both its own relatively short history and China’s long history for ideas and 
inspirations.  
The Party also examines ideas and experience from outside of China as it 
constructs an alternative model of development to democratization that is suited to 
the ‘special conditions of China’. An important set of lessons the Chinese Communist 
Party learned are the causes that led to the collapse of Communism in the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe (Fewsmith, 2001: 52-3). Also of great interest to the Party 
are the experiences of the ‘Asian tiger economies’ under authoritarian rule. In this 
context the case of Singapore is deemed particularly relevant, as its dominant 
People’s Action Party is able to stay in power continuously by delivering what the 
local people want and co-opting potential or actual critics into its ranks (Chen, 1993: 
5-10). The final product is, however, what the Communist Party chooses to put 
together regardless of their origins and label as a distinctly modern Chinese 
approach. 
 In choosing an instrument to deliver good governance the Party leadership 
rejected both a new strongman and a democratic system. Instead it picked the 
Communist Party itself (Xinhuanet, 2006). It is an instrument that requires constant 
reform and updating. The Party seeks to meet the new challenges ‘by attempting to 
broaden its membership base, promoting a new generation of leaders, reformulating 
its ideological content, appealing to nationalist impulses in society, strengthening its 
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organizational apparatus throughout the country, and opening the channels of 
discourse within the party and between the party-state and society’ (Shambaugh, 
2008: 9). Such an approach, which is reinforced by increasing institutionalization and 
merit based promotion, as demonstrated in the peaceful generational transfer of 
power in the Sixteenth Party Congress of 2002, has helped to create what Andrew 
Nathan has called ‘resilient authoritarianism’ (Nathan, 2003: 6-17) – an increasingly 
stable kind of authoritarianism that is distinct from strongman politics. 
 To do so, the Communist Party is prepared to introduce reforms in the political 
arena aimed at enhancing its own capacity and that of the state to govern effectively. 
It should be emphasized that such reforms are not political reforms but governance 
reforms. They are not meant to be political changes in the direction of 
democratization but administrative and other changes intended to pre-empt the need 
for democratization (Tan & Xiao, 2006: 215-6). The Party uses ‘a mix of measures to 
shore up popular support, resolve local protests, and incorporate the beneficiaries of 
economic reform into the political system’ (Dickson, 2005: 37). Reforms, including 
anti-corruption drives and enhancing the Party’s capacity to know the trends of public 
opinions, are deemed as necessary to enhance positively the governance capacity of 
the Party. At the same time the Party also ‘forcefully represses efforts to challenge its 
authority and monopoly on political power and organization’ (Dickson, 2005: 37).  
 The biggest difference between Jiang Zemin’s approach and that of his 
successor Hu Jintao lies in the latter’s tendency to do so by revitalizing selectively 
some of the Maoist ideas or practices to strengthen the capacity of the Communist 
Party. They include, for example, putting new emphasis on reviving the principle of 
democratic centralism (Wang, 2006: 354). as well as making a public commitment to 
redress the neglect and abuse faced by the rural population, who had been left 
behind in the rush towards fastest possible growth under Jiang. This represents a 
stronger recognition that the Party must deliver social justice in order to pre-empt 
discontent in the countryside from developing into a source of instability (Shambaugh, 
2008: 114-5). Hu Jintao takes the view that ‘the biggest danger to the Party … has 
been losing touch with the masses’ and the Party leadership must therefore ‘focus on 
the core issue of the inextricable link between the Party and the masses’ (quoted in 
Nathan & Gilley, 2002: 193-4). His approach also reflects awareness of how effective 
some of the Maoist mobilization and propaganda methods were, before they gained 
a strong negative connotation for being the instruments that made the disasters of 
the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution possible. It was Leninism 
modified to incorporate effective consultation of the general public by practising 
democratic centralism. 
 
What does this imply? 
 Specifically the development model the post-Deng leadership has devised 
seeks to support rapid and sustainable growth as the basis for ensuring public 
support for the continuation of Communist Party rule without resorting to the ballot 
box. In return, the party devotes itself to deliver the following objectives: 
 build a framework for political and social stability, including institutionalizing 
the framework for periodic changes of leadership, rule by law and reduction of 
corruption; 
 enhance the administrative capacity, including institutionalizing promotion on 
the basis of merit, so that the state (led by the Party) can deliver real 
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improvements in the living conditions of the people; 
 strengthen the state and the Party’s capacity to reach out to the general 
population and win over their support; and 
 re-invigorate the ideological framework to secure the loyalty of the people. 
The greater emphasis laid on institutionalization unquestionably helps to make 
Chinese politics less volatile. It has resulted in the peaceful and relatively uneventful 
transfer of power between Jiang’s ‘third generation’ leadership and Hu’s ‘fourth 
generation’ leaders. The significance of this development should not be overlooked 
as Jiang and Hu are the first two anointed successors to have successfully taken up 
office as the top leader in the PRC in six decades. It marks a break from the past 
when all anointed successors, from Liu Shaoqi to Zhao Ziyang ended their careers in 
dramatic and in most cases tragic circumstances.  
If the pattern set by Jiang and Hu’s succession to the top is sustained (and 
there is so far no strong evidence to suggest it will not be) this will make the politics 
of succession nearly predictable, even if this involves considerable horse-trading 
behind the scene. The resistance on the part of Jiang to hand over all powers and 
positions to Hu in 2002-3 suggests that Jiang was tempted to try to assert himself as 
the paramount leader (Ru & Zhai, 2002: 50-2). But the fact that he had to relinquish 
all such offices, including the Chairmanship of the Central Military Commission by 
2004 confirms that those who favour institutionalizing the succession process won 
eventually. The new practice that is being institutionalized also provides for future top 
leaders to be placed as an apprentice or deputy to the top leader for five years before 
ascending to the top in the state and the Party. The handing over of power may not 
be democratic but it is becoming structured, stable and basically predictable. 
 Another important element of the institutionalization process is the increasing 
importance being put on enforcing the law and containing corruption. In sharp 
contrast to the Maoist days when the law was reduced to irrelevance, major steps 
have been taken by the Communist Party to rule by law (Chen, 2006: 195-6). To be 
sure the Communist Party and its top leadership remain above the law and there is 
no indication that they are individually or collectively willing to subject themselves to 
the law, in contrast to allowing one of their own to face the force of the law in special 
cases.  
A notable and highly illustrative example is the case of Party Secretary for 
Shanghai and Politburo member Chen Liangyu, who was dismissed in 2006 and 
finally jailed in 2008 for 18 years for corruption and abuse of office (Barboza, 2008). 
Chen’s case confirms that the Party will subject one of its own top level leaders to the 
judicial system when it suits the political convenience of the top leadership. On this 
occasion it helped Hu to consolidate his power as Chen was a protégé of Jiang 
Zemin, and his sacking signalled the end of Jiang’s ‘Shanghai faction’ as an effective 
political force. It also helps to project the image that the Party was prepared to punish 
corrupt officials even at nearly the top.  
This case was essentially similar to the downfall of former Beijing Party 
Secretary and Politburo member Chen Xitong. Chen was removed from office in 
1995 and sentenced in 1998 to 16 years imprisonment for corruption and dereliction 
of duty (Faison, 1998). Chen Xitong was required to face the force of the law for 
some of his corrupt deeds because it was in the interest of Jiang and the Communist 
Party for him to do so.  
These two high profile cases also reveal the limits of the law and the anti-
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corruption drive in China. Lower ranked officials guilty of corruption had been 
punished much more severely, including being executed for such a crime.  
What is being put in place in post-Deng China is not the rule of law, essential 
for democracy to function properly and flourish. It is a stronger commitment to allow 
the law to be enforced where politics is not involved. It other words in cases with no 
wider political implications, the law is increasingly being upheld and the Communist 
Party seeks to govern through the enforcement of the law rather than in spite of the 
law (Lubman, 2006: 6-7). The choice of corruption in addition to abuse of power or 
dereliction of duty as the basis for the prosecution of the two Chens reflects a 
recognition on the part of the Party that it must be seen to tackle corruption, even 
though bureaucratic corruption remains entrenched.  
Systemic corruption, as distinct from corruption by greedy individuals, cannot 
be eradicated as China lacks the necessary institutional checks and balances 
against corruption as well as the rule of law and Judicial review or similar due 
processes. However, for a population used to corruption and abuse of power, a well 
presented high profile attempt to contain the ills of corruption still goes a long way in 
rectifying the credibility deficit of the government and the Communist Party. 
The ascendance of the ‘third’ and the ‘fourth generation’ leaders also marked 
another major change from the past, when the top positions were held almost 
exclusively by revolutionary cadres. This generational transfer of power meant 
technocrats had replaced the revolutionary cadres holding all the top offices in the 
government and the party by the time Jiang became the genuine core of the third 
generation leadership in 1997.  
The technocrats have a different outlook from the ‘old revolutionaries’ (Zheng, 
2000: 12). They also recognize that none of them can really take over Deng’s mantle 
as the paramount leader (Shirk, 2007: 46). They cannot justify their hold to power by 
their revolutionary pedigree as founders of the PRC or veterans of the ‘revolutionary 
war’ or of the Long March. Instead they must do so by demonstrating their 
competence and political skills in keeping others in line. 
This implies a greater acceptance of the idea of a meritocracy based on 
expert knowledge in government or in other relevant fields including political 
astuteness required to operate effectively in a Leninist system. Since the legitimacy 
of Communist Party rule after 1989 has been based in part on a de facto social 
contract that the people will acquiesce in the continuation of the Party’s monopoly of 
power as long as the Party will deliver continuous improvements in living conditions, 
improving the governing capacity of the Party is vital.  
The other element that sustains this de facto social contract, namely that the 
Party’s political dominance should not be challenged as it has the will and the means 
to use force to suppress any such attempt, also requires a strengthening of the 
administrative capacity of the Party. With the technocrats lacking the standing Deng 
Xiaoping enjoyed in the armed forces that enabled him to deploy the Army to stage 
the brutal crackdown in June 1989 despite the initial public articulation of reservation 
within the military establishment, the rise of the technocrats to power provides a 
strong incentive for the new top leadership to pre-empt a crisis that will require calling 
out the Army to implement a similar military crackdown.  
 The Party leadership’s need to enhance governance capacity requires a 
greater emphasis being put on merit in recruitment and promotion within the Party 
and the government (Shambaugh, 2008: 142-3). This does not spell the end of 
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privileges or relevance of family background. The so called Princelings faction – or, 
the grouping of senior cadres who are descendants of leaders of the revolution – has 
not visibly suffered from the adoption of a more meritocratic approach in selecting top 
level leaders. On the contrary, many senior cadres of princeling background have 
had privileged upbringings, career backgrounds and family connections that enable 
them to build up the necessary technical competence and political skills to operate 
effectively within the Party. This puts them in good positions to gain promotion on the 
basis of merit.  
The elevation at the 17th Party Congress (2007) of Xi Jinping to become the 
unofficial heir apparent to Hu Jintao shows the Party’s emphasis on meritocracy in 
action. The promotion of Xi, a princeling, despite Hu’s personal preference for 
anointing non-princeling Li Keqiang, has widely been attributed to ‘two things: the 
economic success of two coastal provinces where he served as party secretary; and 
his appeal—or at least factional neutrality—within China's Communist Party’ (Liu & 
Ansfield, 2007). By accepting a system that enables the more able administrators 
and political operators to rise more quickly, the Party is able to ensure that its upper 
echelons are filled by individuals who are most able to work effectively within the 
existing political system. 
 One other factor that has strengthened the general governance capacity of 
the Party is Hu Jintao’s personal quality and approach as the top leader. He is both 
politically astute and decisive though he remains highly cautious. As the top leader 
he appears to have learned a key lesson from the political infightings in the run-up to 
the swelling of the Tiananmen protests of 1989. It is that by acting decisively and in 
unity the Party can reduce the risk of popular challenges getting out of control, which 
happened in the spring of 1989 as internal divisions at the top became public 
knowledge when the Party failed to act quickly and decisively at the start of the 
protests (Nathan & Link, 2001: xxxvi). The swift and effectively choreographed 
responses to the Sichuan earthquake of May 2008 reveals that the top leadership 
was able to react quickly and collectively in defining the framework for responding to 
and reporting on this horrendous natural disaster. When confronted with the first 
crisis since coming to power Hu seized the moment to strengthen the state and the 
Party’s capacity to reach out to the general population and win over their support, 
rather than dithering which would have eroded credibility of his government.  
By dispatching Premier Wen Jiabao to the disaster scene while he retained 
supreme control in Beijing, Hu projected the image that the government cared about 
the victims and that the top leadership worked closely together. It focused public 
attention on the efforts being led by the central government itself and directed media 
coverage to showcase the rescue efforts rather than the sufferings of the victims 
(Spencer, 2008). It also distracted attention, even of the international media, from 
raising obvious questions about China’s less than perfect rescue operations. The 
Chinese government’s decision not to invite and permit foreign rescue teams to go to 
Sichuan immediately after the scale of the earthquake was known meant 
irreplaceable time for rescuing victims from collapsed buildings was lost. In the end 
the first external or foreign rescue teams were only allowed to reach the scene of the 
earthquake in any number on day four, when experience elsewhere established that 
by then relatively few survivors trapped in collapsed buildings or buried under 
rumbles could be pulled out alive. Whatever the government’s considerations were 
for such a decision, the adroit management of the public image of the rescue 
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operations allowed the importance of this specific and inhuman policy decision to go 
largely unnoticed. 
By laying claim to the moral high ground and turning public reactions to the 
disaster into a nationalist response Hu’s government made it possible to win wide 
praise and support from the country generally and to deflect the inevitable criticisms 
on failings in the rescue and relief operations on the ground. Where such criticisms 
cannot be silenced, they were directed against inadequate performance of lower 
level officials in Sichuan and thus avoided criticism being directed against the overall 
performance of the central government. This helps to sustain the central 
government’s positive image and moral authority which, in turn, reinforces it 
governance capacity and legitimacy.  
In addition, by beaming images of ‘Grandpa Wen’ at the front of the disaster 
zone, the Chinese government reached out to the general public nationwide in a 
paternalistic way. Through its well-oiled propaganda machine it created a heroic 
image of the government led by Premier Wen saving victims of a natural disaster in 
the front line and under the overall leadership of General Secretary Hu. Some of 
these images are reminiscent of the early Maoist period when top level leaders were 
portrayed side by side with the ordinary people cheerfully confronting challenges 
nature posed against China’s development. More importantly, the effective operation 
of the propaganda machine enabled the government to claim unobtrusively credit for 
galvanizing the country to respond proudly as a nation, once the outpouring of 
sympathy nationwide turned into self-organized and non-government organization 
(NGO) based efforts to help the victims. With its moral authority established, the 





Sources: Wen’s photograph in Beichuan on 14 May 2008 is from Xinhua, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/photo/2008-05/14/content_8168159.htm (accessed 30 
May 2008); and Mao’s photograph is from the People’s Daily website 
http://media.people.com.cn/GB/40606/4805228.html (accessed 29 May 2008). 
 
This reveals an important improvement in governance capacity as the 
government allowed a much larger scope than usual for NGOs to take civic actions 
at a time of a major natural disaster. It confirms a degree of recognition that allowing 
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a greater scope for civil society to operate during a natural disaster that caught the 
imagination of the nation is unavoidable. But it also reveals the existence of a 
strategy for the government to play a leadership role in directing the efforts of NGOs. 
The approach Hu has adopted is to treat civil society like a bird in a cage. The Party 
or the state is prepared to enlarge the cage as it sees fit but a cage is nonetheless 
maintained. This is to ensure that civil society can have sufficient scope to operate in 
the non-critical realm while its ambition to extend its scope to the critical realm is 
contained so that the development of civil society cannot pose a threat to the 
continuation of Communist Party rule.  
The last thrust of the post-Deng leadership’s efforts to increase its governance 
capacity is to promote nationalism as the new ideological force that binds the country 
together under the leadership of the Communist Party. Since Communism in effect 
ceased being the state ideology sometime between the Tiananmen protests of 1989 
and the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Communist Party needed to put in place 
a new ideological framework. This was in part a reaction to the events in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union as the Chinese establishment began to fear social 
disintegration following ‘the decline of the traditional ideology’ (Zheng, 1999: 51). It 
was also because the Party intended to pre-empt Western values and beliefs from 
captivating Chinese citizens living in an ideological void (Chen: 1996: 74). In any 
event, the provision of an ideological binding force is needed to enable the Leninist 
system function as effectively as before, as the existence of a state ideology is 
integral to the Leninist system.  
The choice of nationalism as the new state ideology is meant to enhance the 
Communist Party’s capacity to stay in power on two mutually reinforcing levels. It is 
to provide a new ideological basis for legitimacy on one hand and to serve as a new 
rallying force to develop a national aspiration around the leadership of the Party on 
the other. After the cleavages created between the Party and the ordinary people by 
the Tiananmen Massacre, the top Party leaders found nationalism ‘the most reliable 
claim to the Chinese people’s loyalty and the only important value shared by the 
regime and its critics’ (Zhao, 2005-6: 134).  They thus ‘moved quickly to position 
themselves as the defenders of China’s national pride’ (Zhao, 2005-6: 134). This 
involved reviving xenophobia, which manifested itself spectacularly in the Boxing 
Uprising of 1900 and ‘continued as a dominant posture in state ideology during much 
of the People’s Republic’ (Brook, 1998: 210). It has been reinforced by the 
leadership’s effort to use it as a rallying point to pursue greater power and prosperity 
for the nation since 1989. 
 More specifically, the Party launched an extensive propaganda and 
educational campaign to indoctrinate the people in patriotism and instil in them a new 
sense of citizenship. It is one that requires the citizens of the PRC to participate in 
affirming ‘the rightness and acceptability of the state, its values, policies and 
agencies’ (Kelly, 2006: 201). At the core of this campaign was to emphasize ‘how 
China’s unique national conditions make it unprepared to adopt Western style liberal 
democracy’ and how China’s existing political system helped to ‘maintain political 
stability, a prerequisite for rapid economic development’ (Zhao, 2005-6: 135).  
By ‘[r]einforcing China’s national confidence and turning past humiliation and 
current weakness into a driving force for China’s modernization’ the Party has turned 
nationalism into ‘an effective instrument for enhancing [its] legitimacy’ (Zhao, 2005-6: 
135). The intention was to instil in the mind of the Chinese people a sense of pride in 
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China and its development that is inseparable from the leadership of the Communist 
Party or a strong feeling of ‘my government right or wrong’.  
 The success of this nationalist indoctrination campaign manifested itself 
dramatically in 2008, the year the Communist Party had intended to launch the 
rebranded modern China on the occasion of the Beijing Olympics. The force of 
nationalism, however, could not be contained until the Olympics as it was originally 
planned. The rise of China in the early twenty-first century had generated so much 
pride that the nationalists could not wait.  
They asserted themselves internationally when the Olympic torch relay 
outside of China generated unfavourable foreign comments and reactions in April. 
The negative foreign reactions were directed mainly at the way the Chinese 
authorities organized the torch relay, which was heavily guarded by elite members of 
the People’s Armed Police dressed as torch attendants. Chinese nationalists reacted 
angrily and strongly against those who demonstrated in foreign cities where the torch 
passed against specific Chinese government policies including that on Tibet (Ramzy, 
2008). What they readily ignored was the fact that by sending elite police officers 
who often told the local police how the torch should be guarded during the overseas 
relay China was interfering into the domestic affairs of the host countries concerned. 
If the same were allowed to happen in reverse, with the country hosting the Olympics 
sending police officers to tell the Beijing Police how to guard a torch relay in Beijing, 
it would have caused huge uproars and resentment. The large number of Chinese 
citizens who responded so nationalistically to protests during the torch relay showed 
that they preferred to choose to ‘side with the government when foreigners criticize it, 
believing that, no matter how corrupt [or misguided] the government is, foreigners 
have no right to make unwarranted remarks about China and its people’ (Zhao, 
2005-6: 136). 
 The Party’s adoption of nationalism also dramatically enhanced its 
governance capacity in the aftermath of the Sichuan earthquake of May 2008. By 
adopting a nationalist approach to the rescue operation and holding back entry of 
foreign teams from reaching the scene, the Chinese government ensured that nearly 
all survivors were saved by soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army and other 
Chinese rescue workers. The heroism of the rescue operations by the Chinese 
nation was thus used to galvanize a countrywide movement to rally around the 
Party’s leadership in the subsequent relief efforts, even though generous foreign aid 
and donations were readily accepted.  
Thus, however well or poorly the Party might have actually performed on the 
ground, and whether bureaucratic corruption and other policy failures were 
responsible for the collapse of a disproportionately large number of school buildings, 
the Party still emerged from this first major test it faced since 1989 stronger than 
before. Just as the astute management of propaganda after the earthquake ensured 
a positive image of the Party being projected, the long standing indoctrination of 
nationalism produced a people ‘willing to dissociate their leaders in Beijing from the 
local officials they blame’ (Mitchell & Dickie, 2008: 5). The Chinese government may 
not be able to silent all grieving parents but it can divert their anger from the central 
government to specific individuals or departments at the local level and reduce the 
negative impact on the credibility of the central government as a whole (Magnier, 
2008).  
 While the Party’s approach to strengthening governance capacity is the key to 
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reinforcing the most important instrument for developing a modern development 
model in post-Deng China, the Party has, as yet, not produced a clear and well 
thought through development model. The underlying principle governing its 
‘development model’ is still essentially the same that the Chinese government 
followed in the heydays of the Dengist reforms. It is one of exploring all options 
gingerly, testing them and adopting those that appear to work, which is best summed 
up in the phase ‘crossing a stream by feeling for stones under the water’. The really 
important difference between the 1980s and the 2000s lies in the much increased 
capacity for the Party to judge what experimental policies work and to take effective 
actions to implement them. The technical competence of the cadres and their mental 
horizon under Hu are substantially greater than their predecessors a generation ago. 
 Another useful concept for understanding the Chinese approach is that of the 
bird cage analogy used earlier. In this analogy the bird represents the 
experimentations required to establish a modern development model whereas the 
cage is the scope and framework within which the bird can fly and seek to push the 
boundary. The Communist Party is the owner of the bird and the cage, and it is keen 
to see the bird put up good shows and make good progress but without breaking the 
cage or breaking out of the cage. With the bird growing and making a case for a 
larger cage, the cage is steadily enlarged but the ultimate decision to do so or not 
rest with the owner, who retains the right and capacity to reduce the size of the cage 
if required.  
This basic concept was first used by party veteran Chen Yun to explain how 
the Communist Party should handle economic policies. But it illustrates well the 
attitude the Party leadership has adopted since the death of Mao in balancing the 
need for the Party to retain ultimate control on the one hand, and to allow the reform 
process sufficient scope to develop so that it can enable China to find its own 
development model on the other. 
With greater self-confidence and increased competence, the Communist Party 
under Hu is willing to allow greater scope than previously for experimentation in 
finding ways to enable China develop faster and faster without moving towards 
developing liberal democracy. Corporatist ideas are taken on board where they 
appear to work. A larger scope is allowed for civil society to operate as long as the 
Party feels confident that it can keep civil society in line when and where required. 
Reinvigoration of Maoist or highly modified Confucian ideas has also been adopted 
where the Party believes they can enhance the ability of the Party to govern more 
effectively or to improve its moral authority. But the bottom line remains unchanged – 
the dominance of the Communist Party, even if intra-party reforms, such as greater 
‘inner party democracy’ may appear to make the top leader more responsive to 
others than his predecessors. Indeed, the increased scope for debates among party 
leaders is one of the means through which the Communist Party searches for a 
Chinese development model. 
While the political and developmental approach adopted by the post-Deng 
leadership is to pre-empt democratization in the Western liberal sense, it does 
include changes that are commonly seen in democratization. They include 
expanding good governance practices, allowing for a greater scope for civil liberties 
and for political participation. In terms of greater political participation the most 
important general elections in China are not those for the National People’s 
Congress but for the Communist Party’s national Congress.  At the 17th Party 
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Congress, held in October 2007, the party leadership allowed 15% of nominees to 
fail to get elected (Thornton, 2008: 8-9). The Chinese government also experimented 
with township level elections since the turn of the century on the basis of 
experimentation with village level elections introduced since the 1980s, however 
limited they might be as genuine democratic exercises (Shi, 2000: 244-6).  
The greater emphasis being put on rule by law and improvements in the 
criminal justice system also means substantial reduction in human rights abuses 
even though dissidents and political activists are treated no less harshly than under 
Deng. The substantial improvements come simply by reducing gross abuses that 
used to be endemic in the criminal justice system because of the poor training and 
standards of judicial personnel, as distinct from political interference into the judicial 
system. Such changes should be recognized as they do bring about real 
improvements to the quality of political life for the general public, even if the primary 
intention is to strengthen the capacity of the Party to stay in power indefinitely. 
 
Applicability elsewhere? 
 The apparent success of the approach of the Communist Party post-Deng 
Xiaoping needs to be put in context. The first factor to take into account is the reality 
that the Chinese government has not faced any real crisis since 1992 after the 
aftershocks of the 1989 protests and the subsequent collapse of Communism in 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union eased, and Deng re-launched the post-Mao 
reforms. With the economy growing at or nearly at double digit since then the Party 
appears to have managed to deliver its side of the bargain in the de facto social 
contract put in place after the Tiananmen Massacre – living conditions clearly 
improved for most though not all. The ability of the top leadership to act collectively 
despite internal differences and factional struggles also sustains the public belief that 
the Party has the means and the political will to suppress any challenge to its hold to 
power. The 2008 Sichuan earthquake merely posed a challenge on governance 
capacity (which was largely met) but not one against the Party’s dominance in the 
country’s politics. The first real test may come, say, after China’s economy slows 
down significantly and over a sustained period or gets into a deep recession, which 
then sets off a groundswell of social movement and dramatically increased political 
tension at the top of the leadership.  
 The other factor that needs to be borne in mind is the fact that the world is in 
the midst of a China fever. Although the rise of China is real and the progress it has 
made in the last three decades dramatic, the achievements of China in the last two or 
three decades have been magnified as they are seen through the perspective of a 
world infatuated with China. The distorted assessments of China’s successes (be 
they presented as real achievements or heightened threats) have two effects.  
To begin with it leads to foreign investors investing more readily in China and 
thus providing capital, human resources, technical knowhow and other resources to 
fuel China’s rapid economic expansion. This ever increasing injection of foreign 
capital and resources has so far enabled China to grow quickly without a 
proportionate increase in manufacturing productivity, though much gain in general 
productivity has resulted from reallocating resources from inefficient state owned 
enterprises to more productive uses in the private sector (Morrison, 2008: 5). It also 
has the effect of further distorting the perception of China’s achievements, as 
success begets success and affects the judgements of almost everyone concerned. 
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As a result the Communist Party leadership acts with greater confidence and its 
policies get implemented with relatively little domestic resistance while the outside 
world increasingly talks of China as the next superpower. This puts China on a 
virtuous circle in terms of economic development as well as increasing the 
governance capacity of its government and generating a benign international 
environment for it to grow.  
 Will this benign environment hold when the Chinese economy eventually 
loses momentum and enters a recession? If this should put an end to ‘the China 
fever’ it may well lead to a strategic rethink among multi-nationals now heavily 
invested in China. An end to net inward capital flow or, worse still, a reversal of 
capital movement can happen with little warning if the psychology underpinning ‘the 
China fever’ should end. If so, the scale of the problems that China will face will be 
magnified, as the virtuous circle can be turned into a vicious circle. The capacity for 
the reinvigorated Communist Party leadership to deal with such a challenge remains 
untested.  
 Thus, while post-Deng governance reforms in China have certainly enhanced 
the capacity of the Communist Party and the Chinese government to direct economic 
development, maintain order and keep stability, it is too early to say how effective 
and sustainable such changes are beyond the foreseeable future. The development 
model that the post-Deng leadership has devised is merely one that stresses 
increasing the governance capacity of the ruling Leninist party without changing the 
nature of the political system. It is one that requires the Communist Party to get its 
policies on the economy, the politics and the society right most of the time. The built 
in safety valve to ensure a major policy or economic failure that may have significant 
negative impact on people’s living conditions that exists in a democracy – a change of 
government via the ballot box – does not exist in the post-Deng model. The only 
‘safety valve’ that exists is nationalism. Apart from diverting public frustration and 
anger away from the Communist Party and the central government, probably by 
channelling them against foreign powers or capitalists and blame them for turning the 
existing benign international environment into a hostile one, what other options are 
there if the Party should fail to sustain rapid economic growth?  
 The largely untested nature of the post-Deng approach adhered to by the 
Communist Party makes this approach unsuitable to be applied elsewhere, 
particularly since most other countries coming out of strongman politics almost 
certainly will not enjoy the exceptionally benign international environment produced 
by the China fever. It is also inherently a risky and difficult to sustain strategy as it 
requires the power that be to get its main economic, political and social policies right 
most of the time. This is a tall order that few modern governments can achieve on a 
sustainable basis. The Singaporean government under the People’s Action Party 
appears to be the only other notable exception apart from post-Deng China, but it is a 
small city-state and itself a source of inspiration for the post-Deng model.  
The scepticism above does not imply that the post-Deng brand of 
reinvigorated authoritarianism will collapse if it should fail to pass the first big test in 
the form of a major economic crisis. On the contrary it is likely to survive as it is 
dominated by an effective, well organized and ruthless Leninist party that is prepared 
to use whatever means to stay in power and to find out, direct and meet public 
expectations proactively. It will only collapse if other forces converge with a major 
economic crisis producing a prolonged political paralysis at the top and a 
This is the accepted version of a chapter published by Routeldge in Hsin-Huang, Michael Hsiao, 
(ed.), Democracy or Alternative Political Systems in Asia: After the Strongman. Abingdon; New York: 
Routledge. (Routledge Contemporary Asia Series): https://www.routledge.com/Democracy-or-Alternative-
Political-Systems-in-Asia-After-the-Strongmen/Hsiao/p/book/9781138658073  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/25225/  
 
groundswell of challenges from below that cause a collapse of the regime’s 
legitimacy and make the top leadership unable to respond effectively together. 
Whether the rise of the new rich in China in the last two decades have produced a 
genuine middle class with the usual middle class ambitions and proclivity to assert 
themselves politically remains to be seen. Even if the reinvigorated consultative 
Leninist state can contain the bottom up social demands in a crisis, a resilient 
authoritarianism battling to survive is hardly a model for development elsewhere.  
For China to become a real model for development it needs to show it will 
pass real tests it confronts in the future. Be that as it may, this political reality will of 
course not deter leaders of authoritarian states elsewhere from choosing to cite 
China as a model in the foreseeable future while it maintains a high rate of growth 
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